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The Liberal Premise 
Commitments in Search of a Premise 
The fundamental human dilemma is how to escape from the jungle without landing 
in the zoo. 
How is it possible to prevent the community from fracturing into fearful and 
ruinous hostilities while protecting the individual from the heel of an intolerant, 
superior ruler? Nearly four centuries ago, a beguiling idea seized the western imagi-
nation: A just balance between disorder and repression could be achieved if the 
state withdrew from the business of imposing an ultimate good. Liberalism, the 
philosophical venture that promoted this apparently simple idea, holds that it is not 
only possible but also morally proper to govern by refraining from decreeing ulti-
mate ends, and that the state's only business is to prevent people from harming each 
other, not to engage in moral projects. Laws and political institutions should free 
us to seek and fulfill our own good as best we can without interfering in the same 
pursuit by others. Liberalism is thus a common life led at arm's length: We can live 
together, but not so close that either we must watch our backs or someone else must 
look over our shoulders. This regime of "ordered liberty"1 has empowered large 
numbers of people to shape their own lives, and the release of energy has led to the 
most astonishing transformation in the human condition known to history. 
The liberal venture was audacious, and for two significant reasons. First, it flew in 
the face of historical evidence. The state had always been an ordainment of God, not 
an artifact of man. The place of people, families, citizens, subjects, and slaves was 
fated and fixed-from ancient times through the Renaissance, the state that bound 
them was thought to be part of the natural order.2 Although history records many 
kinds of states, in all of them rulers ruled1 they did not serve, and they ruled to pro-
mote the good that they commanded. To do otherwise would risk disorder, even 
chaos and depravity. 
The liberal venture was audacious, second, because it required the paradoxical 
belief, as things worked out, that only in the state and by obedience to law was it 
possible to be free. Contrived to remove the yoke of the state, liberalism ultimately 
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was tethered to it. Some acclaimed philosophers of liberty went further, arguing 
that freedom requires wholesale submission-in Rousseau's famous words, citizens 
"shall be forced to be free."3 Without a fine balance, liberalism risks devouring itself. 
Liberalism did not arrive all at once or anywhere conquer the ground com-
pletely.'' Nevertheless, a set of foundational beliefs took root and ripened into polit-
ical institutions and practices that today are widely familiar as the halhnarks ofliberal 
regimes. Although no two writers provide the same list- liberalism is a voluminous 
collection of commentaries without a central scripture5 -most of these institutions 
and practices can easily enough be named. "The core practices of a liberal political 
order," says Stephen Holmes, 
are religious toleration, freedom of discussion, restrictions on police 
behavior, free elections, constitutional government based on a separation 
of powers, publicly inspectable state budgets to inhibit corruption, and 
economic policy committed to sustained growth on the basis of private 
ownership and freedom of contract. Liberalism's four core norms or 
values are personal sewrity (the monopolization oflegitimate violence by 
agents of the state who are themselves monitored and regulated by law), 
impartiality (a single system oflaw applied equally to all), individualltberty 
(a broad sphere of freedom from collective or governmental supervision, 
including freedom of conscience, the right to be different, the right to pur 
sue ideals one's neighbor thinks wrong, the freedom to travel and emi-
grate, and so forth), and democracy or the right to participate in lawmaking 
by means of elections and public discussion through a free press.6 
Other practices that belong on this list include freedom of association; a universal 
franchise; fair hearings; jury trials; an independent bar; public education; universal 
literacy; civilian control of the military; equal right to pursue occupations; and pro-
hibitions against hereditary privileges, secret and ex post facto laws, group guilt, the 
selling of public office, and self-exemption (i.e., everyone, including the lawmaker, is 
to be subject to the Jaw).' An additional practice, less often remarked but essential to 
the notion of fair procedure, is that people are to be held accountable by the norms 
of scientifically accessible evidence.8 These, collectively, are the liberal commitments. 
Though at this level of generality the liberal institutional and procedural commit-
ments are broadly accepted throughout the western world and increasingly beyond1 
their descriptive label has been under steady and often heavy attack, from both the 
right and the Jeft1 for many decades {and longer9). At the outset of World War II, 
Ezra Pound put it that liberalism was a "mess of mush.''10 A few years later, in the 
early days of the cold war, a liberal was said to be "only a hop, skip, and a jump from 
a Communist.''11 A generation later, an acclaimed conservative philosopher asserted 
that liberalism has put ''morality today ... in a state of grave disorder."12 Now, in the 
early twenty-first century, a weU-known historian writes that liberalism connotes 
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"something damnable, unhealthy, and odious.''13 On the left, a noted legal scholar 
proclaimed that "life in modern, liberal society continually denies us the possession 
of coherent personality.''14 A political philosopher, summarizing a strand of commu-
nitarian thought, notes that "liberalism is said to undermine community, to restrict 
unduly opportunities for democratic participation, to create inegalitarian hierarchy, 
and to reinforce egoistic social conflict at the expense of the common good."15 
The less academically inclined, on entering any used bookstore, can find tracts
1 
many by well-known commentators, that procla.im liberalism a "mentaJ disorder" 
" ill I go ess," a "sin~·· "evil," a "tragedy1' an "assault,~ laclting common sense, "fascist," 
"death," "a demonic mob/' and1 more limp, though starkly oxvmoronic wanting ~ ~ ~ I 
erty. And from the modern medium of the blogosphere comes a jejune com-
plaint about the very sound of it: "The biggest problem with modern American 
liberalism may be the word itself -it just hits the car wrong."17 Cynically
1 
one might 
suppose the truer claim is that liberalism foments hysteria. 
How can these attacks on liberalism (which by its very principles encourages 
~he':") ~e squared with the reality of widespread and deeply rooted liberal political 
mst~tu~.~ns? The most obvious answer is that the word has multiple meanings. "Lib-
~r~lism, IS a confederation of connotations, not all consistent or necessarily con· 
JO~ed. Overuse and overextension of [the tcnn) have rendered it so amorphous," 
Judith Shklar insisted1 "that it can now serve as an all-purpose word, whether of 
abuse or praise.''
18 
Liberalism, says Raymond Geuss, "has no definition.''19 He means, 
I should suppose, that it has too many. 20 
In the realm of politics, especially American party politics, liberalism can stand for 
minimalist government, an expansive welfare state, and everything in between. 21 It is 
sometimes taken as a synonym for utilitarianism or egalitarianism (moral theories 
ab~ut.h~an ends) or democracy {a theory about means).22 In a more philosophical 
vem, 1t IS associated with a general idea about individuality, "the belief that the 
~eedom of the individual is the highest political value, and that institutions and prac-
tices are to be judged by their success in promoting it."23 Individuality itself can be 
expressed in a multitude of ways.24 A political-sociological approach has it that "no 
person may be forcibly imprisoned w1thin the class or clan or even family into which 
he was born."
25 
A political-psychological approach holds that "liberals are committed 
to a conception of freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of indi-
vidual ~en and women.''26 And sometimes the political conception is put in moral 
t~rms: [T]he ideal of individual sovereignty ... holds that the only things that can 
nghtly ~e.r~quired of human beings ... are those forms of conduct that are necessary 
t~ ma.xmuzmg the scope of everyone's freedom to control his or her life according to 
his or her own judgments.'127 
Often, liberalism is taken as a rationalist approach to human problems
1 
specifi-
call~, ~e idea that we can and therefore should be social engineers and not rely on 
tradition. Just after World War II, Chester Bowles put it that ''liberalism is an attitude. 
The chief characteristics of that attitude arc human sympathy, a receptivity to 
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change and a scientific willingness to follow reason rather than faith or any fixed set 
of ideas.''28 A century earlier, John Henry Cardinal Newman, a critic, took it as 
expressing the philosophical attitude that all change is good.29 'TI1e liberal is thus 
often characterized as one who believes in the possibility of progress in human 
affairs, and is less likely than the conservative to be deterred in proposing change for 
fear that it will result in unanticipated baneful consequences. 30 
Quite separately, liberalism may describe psychological or cultural moods. Max 
Frankel described these senses in a series of polarities contrasting liberalism and 
conservatism: 
It is liberal to expect corporations to behave like the government. It is 
conservative to expect the government to behave like corporations .... It 
is liberal to risk high-priced failure and costly overruns in almost every 
federal department, except the Pentagon. It is conservative to risk them 
only in the Pentagon .... It is liberal to favor government subsidy for the 
Metropolitan Opera. It is conservative to favor government subsidy for 
the Mets .... It is liberal to wish to expunge most criminal records, except 
for those seeking to buy a pistol. It is conservative to keep such records 
public, except for those seeking to buy a pistol. \I 
The policy judgments expressed in these juxtapositions are not rooted in principle 
but in preferences and outlook. Although Frankel's pairings relate to political mat-
ters, the temperament these terms describe need not be. A fiscal conservative can be 
socially liberal (or, as in the case of the Republican Congress of the early twenty-first 
century, socially conservative and fiscally liberal). A cultural liberal might feel 
inclined to wear his hair long (or she, to wear it extra short or purple); a cultural con-
servative, to visit the barber weekly. But one's hairstyle does not determine beliefs 
about gun control or gay marriage: The cultural liberal or conservative is not logically 
committed to political liberalism or conservatism. Though they may go hand in 
hand, they do not always: Home-schooling parents tend to be political conservatives. 
Yet the very point of home schooling is that a family can teach specific members of 
the next generation, free from the larger community's oversight; this is a form of in-
dividualism that one might have supposed would more likely be the creed of liberals. 
In contrast, liberal proponents of public schooling appear to be advocating forms of 
community building, not, according to some of its critics, a liberal characteristic. 
Shortly after William F. Buckley Jr. died in February 2008, his son Christopher Buck-
ley was asked: "Is liberalism dead in New York?" His response-"The key will be how 
many people start arriving at Lincoln Center in pickups with gun racks."- is a sassy 
reminder of the important distinction between cultural and political labels. u 
Just as important, liberalism is a perspective on beliefs about the state of the world 
and what counts as knowledge. The old joke has it that a conservative is a liberal who 
was mugged, a liberal a conservative who was arrested: One's experiences of the 
The Liberal Premise 7 
world are taken to alter or fix one's outlook about policy and even what constitutes 
fact. In 2008 reports of a bitterly cold winter in many parts of the United States 
cheered a few Republicans because they thought the freeze disproved global warm-
. 33Th . 
mg. e mterpretation of an empirical observation and the factual conclusion they 
took to follow from it seem oddly placed on a liberal-conservative continuum. Why 
shouldn't such news cheer Democrats as well? No one could actually want to bear the 
trouble and expense of repairing the effects of global warming if the threat is empty. 
Presumably the Democrats refused to read the cold winter as evidence disproving the 
global warming thesis. That political leanings can account for opinion of this sort 
suggests that one's philosophical perspectives can determine factual beliefs about the 
world logically independent of the content of the philosophy. 
Attacks on liberalism have much less validity than their combined fierceness 
migh~ suggest, since they arc aimed not necessarily at the philosophical beliefs that 
sustam our political institutions and practices but at the varied other uses of the 
wo:d. The United States may seem to be ideologically volatile, in the sense that it 
SWings betwee~ the parties to express displeasure at the failure of the governing 
~arty t~ solve ~cult problems. But there is no reason to suppose that underlying 
liberal ms~tut10ns are spurned by a majority. Indeed, a recent and well-publicized 
emblematic s1gn that the public is not ready to jettison liberal institutions was the 
apparently nonironical warning to a Southern Republican congressman: "Keep 
your Government hands off my Medicare."H 
Still, that liberalism has so many meanings should counsel caution. Why use the 
word _at _all? The answer is that it remains useful, if appropriately qualified, as the 
descnptive ~er~ f~r a the~ry about the metes and bounds of state power. "[H)ardly 
anyone demes, sa.td the mtellectual historian Shirley Robin Letwin "that 1.he dis-
tinctive political issue since the 18th century has been whether gove:ruuent should 
do more or ~ess."~5 What justifies the power of the state? Over what domains may 
the stat~ legttlmatel~ govern against the wishes of dissenters? Rejecting the long-
held Anstotelian belief that man is zoon po/itikon (a political animal whose ultimate 
good is found onJy in the state),liberalism is the intuition that not everything in life 
that matters can or should be shaped or bounded or fixed or cured by politics and 
Ia~. It names a philosophical system that proposes why limited government, exem-
plified by the liberal commitments, provides the best chance of striking a livable 
balance between disorder and repression, from one age to another. 
The Harm Principle 
l11c Ends, Means, Reach, and Shape of Government 
To ~derstand and justify liberalism, to see why the commitments, institutions, and 
practices that have been instantiated in its name and refined over the centuries are 
consistent and valuable to human life, I propose returning to a core principle that is 
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often taken for granted but rarely explored-the principle that the state's legitimacy 
rests in how it deals with harm. 
Many political philosophers reject this focus, not because harm should be 
ignored but because a preoccupation with the ways we hurt each other seems un· 
glamorous and insufficiently ennobling. Reducing suffering is worthy, to be sure, 
but there is more to life than that. Surely there are more significant tasks for all of us 
collectively to take on. We are called to greater things. We should not stay in the 
trenches when some great good remains to be fought for and won. So perhaps the 
key to justifying and limiting government power is to assign it to pursue a particular 
good or set of goods and to judge its performance by its fidelity to the pursuit. 
The problem for the theorist is that there is no accepted single, universal theory 
of the good. Or to put it perhaps more precisely, there are too many possible candi 
dates. Justice? Salvation? Morality? Tradition? God's will? Peace? Community? 
Efficiency? Prosperity? Growth? Order? Nobility? The ruler's felicity? Human 
flourishing? Autonomy? Adventure? Security? Glory? Conquest? Liberty? 
Equality? Choice? Political participation? Personal happiness? Communal satis-
faction? Some mixture of all these and more? Society teems with different and 
often conflicting beliefs about the individual and collective good, and a multiplicity 
of groups seck disparate ends within single national communities. 
Some people are convinced that they know what is the highest good, and they 
are prepared, or say they are prepared, to live with the consequences of tasking the 
state with its fulfillment. So, for example, accepting the good of tradition and order 
supports a foundational principle of at least one strand of conservatism-that what 
has endured is what is right- and provides the justification for preserving existing 
institutions, whatever they may be and whoever they may oppress.36 Others wish a 
state that will foster fidelity to God's wishes, as manifest in a particular religious 
tradition; a theocracy results. 
If we could agree on a common end, we could seek policies and practices to ac-
compli~h it. But many who have thought through this problem-we might as well 
call them "liberals"- are dubious that any of the many ends on offer will command 
consensus. It is too late in human history, they suppose, to think that any group com-
mitted to a highest good will sacrifice it for a competing but inconsistent good held 
by a more sizable share of others. Liberalism is thus a response both to pluralism 17 
and to the difficulty of persuading dissenters to accept something other than what 
their tradition teaches them. A final end or highest good, then, is unlikely to provide 
an acceptable principle for limiting the exercise of governmental power, since in 
striving to achieve many such ends people would likely cede the state unlimited 
power or acquiesce in its acquiring such power. We know all too many societies that 
have found themselves in thrall to just such a claim. 
The task, then, is to find a workable principle of state action that is self-limiting, 
that yields the liberal commitments we generally prize, and that preserves poten-
tially valuable ends. Several candidates have been put forward, but most are complex 
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and controversial (as we will shortly see). There is one function, however, that 
almost everyone acknowledges government may properly undertake: to reduce, 
deter, and redress the harms that people cause each other. As a theory of harm, lib-
er~~m puts the injuries we cause each other at the center of focus: It is not just an 
~ctivtty of government, but the rationale of government. Government is necessary 
10 the way that engine oil is necessary: Something needs to keep friction at bay 
and parts from rubbing together. Engine oil may not be alluring, but without it the 
vehicle goes nowhere. 
Dealing with harm is a venerable task of government, stretching back to the very 
origins of the state. However adept or inept a particular state may have been in pro-
tecting its population from invaders and from each other, few can have rejected its 
authority to do so, whatever other course or end it may have pursued (as most 
throughout history have done). It is no revelation that states have safeguarded their 
subjects unevenly at best. Poor and primitive states, those with feeble administra· 
tive capacit}'J could do little. Hierarchical societies (and historically most have ele-
vated king, clergy, and nobility over the masses) have protected the few to the 
detriment of the many, actually causing harm to the low-born for the sake of those 
in charge. So the efficacy and sincerity of states in pursuing their protective function 
has, in most places and times, not been high. Still, the political arm of many societies 
~retended to do so and over long periods of time began to do so. And as the liberal 
Impulse took hold in the west, it came to be understood that the state should serve 
an instrumental purpose: to defend, shield, secure, and protect its people. Though 
Thomas Hobbes did not come to liberal conclusions, it was the focal point of his 
16~1 political masterpiece, Leviathan, that the people assigned state power to a sov-
ereign f~r the express purpose of protecting themselves from the war of all against 
all. In his counterpoint four decades later, John Locke suffused his far more liberal 
state with the explicit duty to guard against harm. Ever since, the liberal canon has 
held that the state has a core duty to protect an ever-widening swath of the public. 
T~day we accept without much thought that, in countries with liberal roots, the 
state lS meant to serve us and not we the state. We take for granted that the state's 
primary purpose is to keep us safe and to let us go about our business, so thoroughly 
h~s the state's harm-repelling function penetrated. But for all our easy familiarity 
With this principle ("it's a free country;· we commonly say, "I should be able to do 
what I want as long as 1 don't hurt anybody"), we have not attended deeply to the 
consequences of supposing that dealing with harm should be not merely the central 
purpose of government but its only purpose. 
This proposition- that the government should occupy itself solely with reducing 
harm and its effects-has not been deeply understood, in part because its most elo-
quent proponent, John Stuart Mill, did not explore the meaning of harm, and in part 
because political theorists have not supposed the harm principle sufficiently pow-
erful to account for all that they want the liberal state to do. To the contrary, I contend 
throughout this book, the harm principle deserves a closer look than it usually gets 
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because its contours can be filled in, because it is self-limiting, and because from 
it we can derive all the significant liberal commitments. Since as an explanatory 
principle it is both less controversial and less complex than the other leading candi-
dates, it is more likely, once explained, to attract support (indeed, it is likely already 
the basis of widespread unreflective support) for liberal institutions and practices. 
Though I postpone to a later section an examination of the liberal conception of 
human nature, begin for the moment with the lillCOntroversial notion that some 
beliefs, behaviors, and activities should be left to individual discretion- and that 
these deserve state protection from interference. ~o society can claim to be liberal 
that does not, as Mill said, draw "a circle around every individual human being which 
no government, be it that of one, of a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted to 
overstep," or as Friedrich A. Hayek rephrased it, that does not carve out through 
publicly declared rules at least some "domain of the individuals (or organized 
groups) with which others arc not allowed to interfere."~8 
It follows that in this domain people must be free to act regardless of the conse-
quences both to themselves and others- for example, you do not lose your vote if 
you cast it for the irresponsible candidate. Otherwise the state will necessarily be 
concerned to constrain every action to accomplish some consequence of which it 
approves (or to deter some consequence of which it disapproves), in other words, 
an end or good. In classical liberal theory, this private domain can be established 
only by what have come to be called "negative rules." The state declares what we may 
not do, leaving us free to do whatever is not proscribed. 'This characteristic has been 
much noted. Thus, H. L. A. Hart: "The common requirement of law and morality 
consists for the most part not of active services to be rendered but of forbearances, 
which arc usually formulated in negative form as prohibitions." Lon L. Fuller: "In 
what may be called the basic morality of social life, duties that run towards other 
persons generally ... normally require only forbearances, or as we say, are negative 
in nature." Hayek: "[P]ractically all rules of just conduct are negative in the sense 
that they normally impose no positive duties on any one, unless he has incurred 
such duties by his own actions." The liberal state says: "Thou shalt not do thus and 
"Th li h thi d th t"39 so:' It does not say: ou must act so as to accomp s san a . 
Accept that the state's authority should be limited to declaring negative duties 
duties to refrain. Still, restricting the state in that way will not necessarily ensure 
usable liberty for the individual to pursue an ultimate good. The state could apply a 
negative rule "do not do X, or Y, or Z"-to so many types of conduct that the 
space in which to roam would shrivel. A rule of forbearance, therefore, must be 
self-limiting in some way. 
Since the seventeenth century, only one criterion has gained the assent of liberals 
as a self limiting component of forbearance, and that is the criterion of harm. All 
agree that one ought to avoid harming another, and that the state may intercede 
to prevent one person from causing another harm or to redress a harm that has 
occurred not surprisingly, since a state that frees individuals from the torpor of 
Tile Liberal Premise II 
~raditionalism must then cabin the restless energy of the individual "sovereigns" that 
1t releases. John Locke put it that the law of nature teaches "that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Posses-
sions." Nearly a century later, Adam Smith opined in A Theory of Moral Sentiments: 
Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only 
hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The man who barely abstains 
from violating either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his 
neighbours, has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all 
the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and does every thing which 
his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish 
him for not doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting 
still and doing nothing.~0 
Limiting freedom to prevent people from causing harm is, of course, not exclusive 
to liberalism. Any political theory worthy of the name must at a minimum incorpo-
~ate some version of a harm principle. What makes the harm principle of peculiar 
~terest here is that liberalism, or at least classical liberalism, proposes that prevent-
~g or redressing harm to others is the sole basis on which the state may act. In his 
Fust Inaugural, Thomas Jefferson perfectly stated this proposition: 
With all these blessings (of geography, religion, character, energy], what 
more is necessary to make us a happy and prosperous people? Still one 
thing more, fellow citizens-a wise and frugal Government, which shall 
restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free 
to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall 
not take from the mouth oflabor the bread it has earned. This is the sum 
of good government."'' 
The classic formulation of the harm principle is that of John Stuart Mill, who in 
~8~9 ~ On Liberty asserted "one very simple principle," which, despite its farnil 
tartty, IS always worth rereading and which, as a biographer has said, "is so forcibly 
and memorably argued that it has passed into the public philosophy of all the great 
Western democracies."42 
That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of 
any of their number is self protection. That the only purpose for which 
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised com-
munity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully 
be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
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because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to 
do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remon-
strating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreat-
ing him, but not for compelling him or visiting him with any evil in case 
he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to 
deter him must be calculated to produce evil to some one else. The only 
part of the conduct of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and 
mind, the individual is sovereign.43 
Mill's harm principle certainly seems to embody a negative rather than a positive 
claim of political power: The state may interfere with us to prevent us from harming 
others, even perhaps a tiny harm, but not to force us to do good, even perhaps a 
great one. The harm principle is rooted in a suspicion of state power and justified by 
our uncertainty about the good. The smaller the state's power to command, the freer 
we will be, certainly freer of the state, to seek our own ends. This is a common 
strategy, not reserved to philosophical inquiry. The approach of many social scien-
tists, Charles E. Lindblom has written, is to identify "ills to escape rather than ideals 
to approach .... Unable to describe an ideal tomato, they identify the inedible.""4 
With the meaning and extent of the harm principle I am concerned in all that 
follows. For now, observe that Mill's harm principle has five distinct components 
and that Mill quite incorrectly called it "one very simple principle'': ( l) harm (2) to 
others (3) caused by a wrongdoer (4) permits the state to interfere with (5) the 
wrongdoer's liberty of actiotr. The most visible component is that dealing with 
"others." 1he state may interfere with our liberty only to prevent us from harming 
others; the harm principle rules out, as Mill argues, paternalistic rules. The other 
components have often been obscured. The first is that the state may use its coercive 
power only when what one person does to another is actually hamiful. An action 
that merely affects someone is not, simply by virtue of the effect, a harm that the 
dr 45 th. 1 It ali . .. a: 1h state may prevent or re ess; ts component ru es out mor sbc euects. e 
third, and much more ambiguous, component is that the state may deal only with 
harm actually caused by another human being. Mere suffering, misfortune, or bad 
luck, therefore, are not ipso facto the types of injuries that permit the state to inter-
vene. Fourth, an important question is the manner by which the state may interfere 
with liberty. What methods, sanctions, and remedies may the state use or impose to 
deter or redress the harm? Detecting conduct that might (or did) lead to harm, may 
the state threaten with criminal sanctions or civil fines, issue civil injunctions, award 
private damages, or otherwise "regulate"? Finally, what is the "liberty of action" with 
which the state may interfere? Is the state restricted to imposing physical restraints 
against the person (incarceration), or may it interfere with other sorts of liberties 
(the liberty to contract, the liberty to possess property)? Whether the harm principle 
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can specify under what conditions lhe state may limit any or all of the types of 
liberties is an important part of the .ssue at hand. 
By its terms, the harm principle seems to prescribe a narrow function for govern-
ment, nothing more. So restricted, it might provide the basis for some of the institu-
tions and practices we associate with liberalism, but not likely all or even most of 
them. Where, for example, is separation of powers to be found within its contours, 
or frequent elections, or a universal franchise? As it will turn out, the harm principle 
cannot serve only to justify and limit the exercise of power. It must also serve to 
establish and maintain a government that will both adhere to the harm principle 
and faithfully carry it out. 
To be useful as a principle of govemment, then, the harm principle is complex in 
yet another way. A government, even one that draws its energy from the harm prin-
ciple, is not just a programmed machine, calibrating its power with a dial that moves 
from "off" to "full." We cannot simply instruct whoever is in power to sweep away 
harmful activity and avoid all else. No such machine does or can exist. Government, 
in any event, is not a machine at all, but a collection of people with their own interests 
and motives. To expect a harm principle to live up to its name, it must be capacious 
enough to confront government along a number of dimensions. 
First, we must be concerned with the objects of government power. The harm 
principle must, as Mill observed, exert itself against harm to others. So it is necessary 
to consider the nature of harm, what it means to harm. Chapters 2 and 3 examine 
these issues, concluding that while the intent of the harm principle is to narrow the 
focus of government power, what remains open to it is, while constrained, neverthe-
less quite sizable. One particularly significant human activity, the economic market, 
as chapter 4 shows, is subject to policing under the principles developed. 
Second, beyond the objects or activities subject to the government's power, the 
harm principle must specify to some degree the extent of the power to be exercised. 
~en may the government intrude? Must the harm be already manifest? What may 
lt tackle? Is it limited to holding up a stop sign or may it affirmatively undertake 
:anous "projects" that might be seen as attempting some good rather than prevent-
mg some evil? Chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine these questions, concluding that the 
government may broadly tailor its efforts to deal with the whole range of actions 
t~at under the principle may be characterized as harmful. That to carry out its rnis-
Ston the government may even direct that people carry out affirmative duties, rather 
than merely refrain from harmful conduct, is the subject of chapter 6. 
'lhird, to be useful as a practical matter, the harm principle must instruct us on 
the means and methods that the government may use to enforce the principle's pre-
cepts. Prescribing the death penalty for most offenses under the penal code, as 
n~arly was the case in eighteenth-century Great Britain, leads to disrespect, rusobe-
dtence, and a disinclination to follow the ordinances, even if in some way within the 
outer limits of the governing principle.461he modes of intervention, and the limits 
on the forms and reach of those modes, are the subject of chapter 7. 
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Fourth, we need some assurance that the harm principle can actually be carried 
out, without being co-opted or corrupted by the government it means to legitimate. 
The harm principle, in other words, is not a collection of legal ordinances or even a 
method of deducing rules that can be enacted into legal restrictions on our conduct. 
To the contrary, the harm principle is just that -a principle-and it requires explica-
tion. The question of who should interpret it and give it concrete form in particular 
instances is particularly urgent. And not merely who, but subject to what sorts of con-
straints. So the harm principle must necessarily have much to say about who consti-
tutes the government, bow its parts are to be arranged, and the sorts oflimitations that 
can be imposed, not merely theoretically but by virtue of institutional practices, such 
as separation of powers, frequent elections, and decisions constrained by evidence. In 
particular, the harm principle implies the right of every person to participate in the 
political life and have a say in formulating its varied applications to the harms that 
abound. These issues are considered in chapter 8. 
Fifth, the harm prmciple may seem to embrace all of life. But it does not, as it 
explicitly proclaims. It is the burden of chapters 9 and 10 to explore the reasons for 
barring the application of harms that a person may bring upon himself or that argu-
ably befall the culture and the norms of the community. 
Sixth, all the considerations just noted imply certain other principles that are not 
so much adjunct theories about government power and limitations as they are con-
sequences of the harm principle itself. Significant among them are: ( 1) the principle 
of equality, which states that in ways to be determined the state must treat each per-
son as it treats all others; (2) the principle of neutrality, which asserts that the state 
may not impose on people its own notions of their good, if harm is not at stake; (3) 
the principle of consent, which states that the public has a stake in the functions and 
outputs of government and each person must therefore be permitted to register 
consent or disapproval of the government's policies to the extent feasible; and ( 4) 
the principle of dialogue, which states that the people must be free to thmk, believe, 
associate, and talk to one another and the government, charged as it is to deal with 
the harms that impede their life's fulfillment. 
Saddling a principle with all these tasks may seem a tall order. Perhaps alternative 
principles can more easily explain the liberal commitments than the complex of 
considerations that constitute the harm principle. 
Liberal Alternatives to the Harm Principle 
Beginning in the early 1970s, political theorists raised liberalism into the realm of 
high theory. As theories these ideas became imaginative (and, one is quickly 
drawn to observe, imaginary), intricate, sometimes dazzling, but brought to the 
ground of policy and politics, faint and largely unheeded. Four major strands 
emerged, all with old roots but none that bad ever been developed in such rich and 
comprehensive ways. Each-consent, dialogue, equality, and neutrality-has 
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been the subject of an extensive literature offered as the basis for understanding a 
liberal political order. Even if this book were devoted to their themes, rather than 
to another, I could not begin to do them JUStice, much less make sense of any of 
them in a short passage. So although I offer a somewhat more extended critique in 
the Appendix, here I can only fleetingly assert the essence of each and mention 
some difficulties. 
Consent-based liberalism rests the exercise of political power on the consent of 
the governed, in the familiar phrase. Social contract theory sees no need to justify 
consent, since as a practical matter when people freely agree they are unlikely to com-
plain or seek an alternative. Assuming that consent extends to the form and methods 
of government and its objects and limits, a full-blown theory of government can be 
spun out. But its defect is immediately apparent: Legitimacy depends on actual con-
sent, and we can be confident that in no state could everyone have consented to the 
shape and reach of government, which in most lands was in place before anyone 
thought to question its legitimacy. Social contract theorists are drawn to just-so 
stories or fanciful constructions of how consent might rationally be achieved. John 
Rawls, for example, put imaginary people around a table, shorn of most of the char-
acteristics that make us what we are, and inferred how these wraiths and changelings 
might reason their way to principles of justice. It turns out that to achieve even this 
consensus, the theorist must specify other principles- for example, the rules that 
will structure the dialogue in which the conversants will engage. But if what justifies 
the rules is consent1 then the participants arc in a vicious circle1 for before they can 
consent they must proceed under rules that can be justified only by prior consent. 
So the consent is not primary and collapses mto other requirements and principles. 
In any event, whether or not other principles are prior to the practice of consent, 
hypothetical consent is not consent and cannot reasonably serve as the justification 
for the exercise of power. 
Dialogue as the theoretical basis of political order suffers from a similar difficulty. 
At its broadest, the theory is that legitimate rules of state will emerge when people 
sit down to talk things through. They will, say the proponents of dialogue, convince 
each other of what rules to adopt for the government to which they will be subject. 
~bile no one can doubt the usefulness of actual conversation among real people, it 
IS not likely to be effective unless the people proceed under rules that will guide the 
discussion. But that is the point of the conversation: to hammer out the rules that 
will guide political debate. So the conversation to construct rules cannot proceed 
unless such rules are in place to begin with. Again, the theory seems to collapse into 
a circularity (or into more than one, since one of the questions to be resolved is 
whether all are to be treated equally in the grand founding dialogue; if so, then 
perhaps it is equality that is the founding principle). Moreover, there is no theoret-
ical reason to believe that an unconstrained conversation among the people (if that 
Were possible) would have any obvious stopping point (beyond the fatigue of the 
moment), nor is there any reason to feel confident that the conversation would 
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conclude with normatively valid rules. Unlimited conversation could lead to any 
outcome: Hobbes's leviathan as well as a worker's council. 
The claim of egalitarians is that liberal political theories must begin with equality 
because we lack a sound basis to assume the entitlement of particular people to 
priority in governing or in political outcomes. Start, then, with the premise that 
liberal commitments are justified to the extent that they bind the state to give each 
person equal respect. But it is unclear whether an equality rule is based, instead, on 
an antecedent rule of neutrality: The state must pay equal respect to persons because 
there is no a priori account of which person's end or good is best. (Otherwise, an 
equality criterion might be paternalistic, allowing the state, in paying equal respect, 
to deny a given person the ability to live his own life on the ground that his poor 
choice overlooks his "true" interests.) Moreover, the abstract notion of equality is 
insufficient by itself to determine what is to be equalized. Perhaps it is liberty, per-
haps resources-but a preliminary equality criterion may be compatible with a 
narrow set of liberties or a meager redistribution for all. Equal respect might require 
no more than paying careful and sincere attention to each person in determining 
whether the state should extend the freedom to act or redistribute the social prod-
uct; it need not compel the state to do so. 
A fourth strand, neutralit}'J holds that liberal institutions and practices are conse-
quences of abstaining from politically pursuing the good. I have already noted the 
liberal's propensity for just such a rule: the great difficulty, if not irnpossibilit}'J of 
ascertaining the proper end amid a welter of conflicting claims. But premising the 
liberal state on such a foundation, the critic charges, involves a contradiction in 
terms: Declaring neutrality the state's prime directive IS itself the choice of a good. 
It enshrines a rule of choice, against the preferences of many people not to live in a 
society in which choice is available. Moreover, the state is open to the same critique 
whenever it determines on any course of action, since that very choice is to pursue 
some good, a pursuit that neutrality as the core principle would presumably require 
it to relinquish. 
That these various foundational principles are subject to the reproach that they 
are circular or self-contradictory, or that they may collapse into each other's 
domains, does not mean that they play no part in liberal institutions and practices. 
Each is a significant constituent of the liberal order, not because xt starts with them 
but because, as already noted, they are entailed by the harm principle itself. 
The Modesty of the Harm Principle 
Mill's version of the harm principle is now 150 years old. Widely acknowledged, it 
has also been widely dismissed, usually because, its critics assert, the concept of 
harm is too vague to give the principle any traction.47 As one political theorist sum-
marizes the objection: "Since any activity may be deemed harmful, the principle 
has no cutting edge to be employed in the distinction oflegitimate and illegitimate 
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interference:"'8 But the critiques often stop just there, denying the principle's utility 
without further examining whether it has bite or reach or can effectively draw the 
lines that describe a liberal order. It is the burden of much of this book to undertake 
just that examination. 
Still, it may be worthwhile to consider in briefest compass the sort of work a prin· 
ciple is supposed to do-and the modesty of the harm principle in comparison. You 
might rashly demand that a principle definitively resolve all relevant questions that 
may be fairly put to it, just as a mathematical formula tells us without fail how to 
convert a temperature reading from Fahrenheit to Celsius. Some legal rules permit 
definitive judgments-if the person sitting on the barstool is provably twenty-one, 
he may legally buy a beer; otherwise, not. But these are not the sorts of problems 
that fundamental principles are asked to resolve. What we expect to gain from them 
is not how to decide whether someone is complying with a legal rule but whether 
there ought to be a law in the first place. The primary question for the legislature is 
not how to prove a teenager has been tippling but whether the state should prohibit 
a class of people from drinking at all. A political regime that rests on an external 
code, like the Bible, will have a relatively easy time of it. If it is a sin to commit adul-
tery than it is simple to see that the legislature may crirninalize the prerogative of 
kings. That is not our situation. The question that has confronted political thinkers 
for more than three centuries is how to determine the legitimate scope of political 
power. A principle that could definitively map the state's reach would be as valuable 
as it is unprecedented, and unlikely. 
Some have supposed that a "genuine" political theory must provide "a set of prin-
ciples that, by themselves, determine what should be done without the need for 
further ad hoc moral judgment, given any specification of the factual circumstances 
in which the principles are to be applied."49 Mill supposed that utilitarianism, which 
he championed, was such a theory because its fundamental theorem provides a 
determinate outcome when the facts are known: Individual actions and public pol-
icies are morally correct if they maximize total satisfaction or utility across society. 
If society's total happiness would be increased by assassinating mighty Casey at the 
Bat after he struck out, thus slaking Mudville's frenzied mob's thirst for revenge, it is 
right to do so, even though Mrs. Casey might feel sad for a time.50 There are, of 
course, two reasons to suspect such a theory of failing its mission. The first is the 
well-known major theoretical weakness of utilitarianism, that a social maximum 
need not respect persons, so that a utilitarian regime can sacrifice some people for 
the greater satisfaction of others. 51 Just this defect fueled Rawls's assault on utilitar-
ianism: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override:'52 The second weakness is that even 
accepting the standard, in almost all cases we will find it impossible to apply: How 
do we know the utility functions at issue and how can we tell, even if the net satis-
faction of society is immediately maximized, that tl1e killing will not so frighten 
other players that the game of baseball will collapse, thereafter decreasing the net 
18 LIBERALISM UNDRESSED 
social satisfaction? The abstract standard "maximize" contains no workable calculus 
of decision. 
Other theories that purport to derive a determinate rule suffer from similar 
defects. Thus, to decide under what circwnstances the state may interfere with the 
market distribution of goods, Rawls proposed his "difference principle," which fol-
lows a "maximin" rule: Inequalities are to be arranged to maximize the primary 
goods that go to the worst-off; or, to put it differently, to choose that alternative that 
is the least worst. But this rule is also far from determinate. For one thing, Rawls 
cannot specify which persons are the "least advantaged," and so he "plead[s] prac-
tical considerations ... because [s]ooner or later the capacity of philosophical or 
other argwnents to make finer discriminations is bound to run out:' The practical 
consideration leads him to choose an arbitrary and blunderbuss standard that 
counts as least advantaged "all persons with less than half of the median income and 
wealth."53 (Not for Rawls the Shakespearean exaltation in Sonnet 29: "For thy sweet 
love rememb'red such wealth brings I That then I scorn to change my state with 
kings:') 1he maximin rule is also unconcerned with the number who are benefited 
(it could favor small nwnbers of the worst-off to the detriment of large nwnbers of 
others only slightly better off), and it fails to account for the gains won and lost. 
"Maximin would prefer the outcome in which a single worst-off person gains a penny's 
worth of benefit at the cost of the loss of thousands of dollars for each of thousands of 
the better-off."54 So the claim that aggregation (maximizing) and priority (ordering) 
rules are necessary to make theories "genuine" seems suspect. Such calculation rules 
rarely (most likely, never) provide definitive resolutions to particular issues in the real 
world because we cannot specify precisely enough the factual circwnstances that 
count. The calculations may be too difficult or the things being counted may be too 
indistinct. 
The harm principle is more modest. It is not an aggregating or prioritizing principle. 
It does not require the state to maximize liberty by minimizing harm or maximizing 
the state's response to it. Since most interests are incommensurate, and since few inter-
ests can be quantified, maximizing policies, even if they could be made into workable 
formulas, would yield specious results. ~s The harm principle answers the question 
whether the state may legitimately act, without specifying a necessarily determinate 
outcome in each case. It holds that dealing with harm (reducing, preventing, and 
redressing harm) is a justifiable aim of government. The state may deal with harm in 
all its guises in appropriate ways. But the consequence of a theory that does not 
maximize is that the state is not compelled to act in a certain way, or even act at all; 
prudential concerns of all sorts may counsel caution and forbearance in the face of 
harms, both high and low. (Nothing in the harm principle decrees a particular jail 
term for robbery, or even a jail term at all-music downloading, anybody?) The 
harm principle, then, states a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition for 
government to act. If harm is in the air, government may sniff it out, but it need, 
indeed, ought not, try to diffuse it all.ln real societies with limited resources, people 
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face a multitude of misuse and mischief, a kaleidoscope of harm and peril; to 
demand that the government go this way and that to root it all out is to risk dissi-
pating its strength and making all worse. 
That is nota defect in the theory; it is a condition of our world. We face irreducible 
uncertainty both in the background of events and in our ability to predict accurately 
what will occur or to determine from measurements and models how to explain 
a phenomenon. No one can say with ultimate confidence how we should allocate 
resources to minimize harm. Will there be an earthquake? Very well, spend money 
to retrofit buildings; or move everyone elsewhere. But in retrofitting buildings, 
people will die in construction accidents. Very well, allocate resources to building 
engineers to design safer ways to build. But that will take time and in the meantime 
an earthquake may strike. And money spent on earthquake prevention is money 
diverted from health care, traffic safety, and myriad other activities that cause or 
pose a risk of harm. Does a particular prescription drug have an unsafe side effect? 
Very well, pull it from the market. But if we do so, many who might have benefited 
from it will now suffer, perhaps even die. Are illicit drugs harmful? Very well, 
enforce the laws against them. But drug enforcement is very costly and puts many 
users in jail who have not harmed and would not harm anyone. The risk of false 
positives and false negatives attends every potential decision. No algorithm exists, 
and none can be devised, to avoid them, despite the vague claims of utilitarians and 
others that their principles can be applied with perfect fidelity and justice to the 
world at large. 56 
The Self: Autonomous Solitary or Communal Solidary? 
Like all political theories, liberalism begins with a conception of human nature. It 
presupposes a "self," a personality that has moral agency and at least some capacity 
for autonomous choice. Each person is an individual, with an inner being distinct 
from all other people, who need not identify herself solely as a fixed member of the 
community into which she was born. Each person, moreover, behaves in ways about 
which other people may make moral judgments. Without such a notion ofhwnan 
nature, liberalism, and the harm principle that underwrites it, would make no sense. 
Why provide a private space around every hwnan being unless each person has a 
capacity and reason to live and act in it? 
This conception of the self, as unexceptionable as it by now may seem, has faced 
severe, but usually misleading, criticism. In recent years, liberals have been accused 
of relying on a mythical, impossible being: the "unencumbered self," a self that is 
"prior to its ends" and that from its own resources somehow cobbles up a destiny to 
seek. The reality, the critics assert, is quite to the contrary: a "situated self," a self 
constituted by its endsj that is, a person whose selfhood derives beliefs, desires, and 
ultimate ends from the social norms of the community in which he was born and 
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raised.57 The unencumbered self is associated with the anthropologically naive 
theory of a social contract. 58 However, that the social contract argument, first asso-
ciated with Thomas Hobbes, is erroneous scarcely undercuts the liberal argument. 
Hobbes wrote at the dawn of the scientific revolution. The new scientific method 
rejected the Aristotelian notion of final cause, an approach to the natural world that 
had endured for nearly two millennia. Scientists after Galileo no longer expected to 
understand a phenomenon by deducing its causes from a purpose that itself could 
only be derived from metaphysical speculation. Instead, scientists resolved the 
whole of any phenomenon into its elements and then looked for laws that governed 
them. An early statement of scientific reductionism was made by Francis Bacon, 
who in his 1620 work The New Organon declared that "in nature nothing really exists 
besides individual bodies, performing pure individual acts according to a fixed 
law:.w In physics, this new approach led to Newton's triumph. In social science, this 
same approach seemed likewise to require repudiating Aristotelianism, specifically 
the view that human community was prior to any individual.60 
Applying these principles to the social realm, Hobbes, a friend and admirer of 
Galileo, asserted that "nothing in the world [is] Universal! but Names; for the things 
named, are every one of them Individual and Singular:.6t Hobbes took the general 
political phenomenon he wished to explain-political community -and dissolved 
it into what he conceived to be its elements, disconnected individuals, possessing 
natural rights, living in an isolated original condition he called the "state of nature." 
The whole he then reassembled according to the logic by which these atomistic
62 
individuals behaved. Hobbes made two assumptions about natural humans not 
bound by political restraints: that each would seek power over others and that all are 
fundamentally equal in body and mind (differences from person to person, he held, 
were contained within narrow limits). From these assumptions Hobbes easily 
deduced that the state of nature was a state of war, a condition so fearful and uncertain 
that for the sake of industry, culture, navigation, building, technology, arts, letters, 
and security, solitary individuals had long ago mutually agreed in a "social contract" 
to yield their individual rights to a sovereign. Individuals, then, are the enduring 
reality; the state is their instrument, artificially created to serve their interests.63 
So ran the argument, quite contrary to preliberal beliefs, and it ran pretty far, 
straight to the nineteenth-century conclusion that each person ought to be virtually 
free and independent of the state. Since individuals come first, their rights must 
come first; the artificial construction of "society" cannot have rights superior to 
those who constitute it. As the British essayist William Hazlitt put it in 1828: 
Society consists of a given number of individuals; and the aggregate right 
of government is only the consequence of these inherent rights, bal-
ancing and neutralising one another. How those who deny natural rights 
get at any sort of right, divine or human, I am at a loss to discover; for 
whatever exists in combination, exists beforehand in an elementary 
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state. The world is composed of atoms, and a machine cannot be made 
without materials.64 
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Hazlitt's error is obvious: One might as well say that since spleens exist in combina-
tion with kidneys in each person, both spleens and kidneys must have existed 
beforehand by themselves.65 
Nevertheless, the apparent scientific premise of this idea of the self has retained a 
powerful hold on our thinking to this day. Even its detractors seem unable, at times, 
to avoid it. For example, Stephen Spender, the British poet and critic, denouncing 
the modem emphasis on the fulfillment of private interests, once argued: 
Throughout history the comparative failure of every human generation 
has been that of the inability of those living to think of life as a single 
consciousness of which each separate contemporary person is a minute 
extension, and not a whole world unto himself or herself. No one is to be 
blamed for this failure which is indeed the result of the condition of iso-
lation into which each of us is born.66 
Despite its lineage, this doctrine of the biological and historical primacy of the 
individual is hopelessly at odds with what we have come to learn about human 
development and history. That birth itself is an expulsion "into isolation" may be a 
physical fact, but it is not a sociological, psychologtcal, genetic, or neurological 
fact, and it is, after all, only a moment, before and after which each person is neces . 
sarily connected to others. Spender has confounded a single moment of separation 
at birth with the socialization of childhood. Studies of psychological and social 
developmenr show that the adult personality is not self-created: Individuals do 
not and ca.nnot precede the community of men and women into which they arc 
born.68 It blinks reality to maintain that people shape themselves, that their very 
desires, preferences, beliefs, enthusiasms, hopes, and fears are rationally chosen, 
rather than implanted, grown, shaped, and nurtured by parents and family, play-
mates, neighbors, and even strangers in the community, by the actions they take 
and the stories they tell-or that this process stops when the child becomes an 
adult. Family socialization, Michael Walzer has quipped, "is just agitprop with 
love."69 Socialization, though it can take innumerable forms1 is universal. Decades 
before evolutionary psychologists caught up, Lewis Mumford wrote that "man 
might even be defined as a creature never found in a 'state of nature; for as soon as 
he becomes recognizable as man he is already in a state of culture:''0 
Considerable evidence suggests that through most of our existence humans 
have thought of themselves first as players on the community's stage, not as writers 
of their own lines. Throughout the medieval era, Jacob Burckhardt wrote, "man 
was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family or 
corporation-only through some general category.'.n Man, it was assumed, had a 
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place in a divinely ordered "great chain ofbeing"72 and as Tocqueville noted, "every 
individual necessarily belonged to a group and no one could regard himself as an 
isolated unit.''7 ' 
Psychologically and historically, then, there is no unencumbered self, and there 
never was. Human beings are not self-made; no ghostly 'T' sits in some control seat 
in the mind willing a "me" into existence by assembling a psychological unity from 
' -.. 
a stockpile of desires, beliefs, and dispositions.'4 Humans are forged from others. · 
They must necessarily be situated selves. The situated self is not a solitary self; it is, 
rather, a solidary self, constituted by others and responsible to them. In this telling 
(discussed in more detail in chapter 10), it is the community, not the individual, that 
is the carrier of value.76 
Nevertheless, when used to deny liberal premises, the conclusions drawn from 
the modem account of the self suffer from three fallacies. The first is the non sequi-
tur that derives rights from the creation of a selC7 1here is no necessary or logical 
connection between rights and the origin of the individual. It does not follow that 
because my genetic, family, and cultural background determine my dreams and 
desires the community may dictate the ends I should seek, or that if somehow all on 
my own I had wished myself into being the community would be bound to permit 
an autonomous me to do whatever I pleased. In short, it no more follows from the 
social priority of the community that the individual should have no rights than it 
follows from the moral priority of the individual that the community, through the 
state, should have no power. The relationship between individual and community is 
the very problem to be solved.'8 
The second fallacy is the tacit assumption the antiliberal makes about the nature 
of the situated self. That the self is shaped by community says nothing about what 
sort of self the community will create. That depends on the community. There is no 
single "natural" communal approach to child-rearing and no single communal view 
about the appropriate relation between individual and community. Why else bas 
there been a philosophical conversation about these issues lasting now more than 
two millennia? 
A community may fashion selves who view themselves solely as part of a general 
category within the social mass, as Burckhardt characterized the psychological as-
sumption of the Middle Ages. But the acculturated self is not logically and inherently 
a clone of the community, slavishly adhering to community norms. A community may 
instead create the sort of individual capable of self-reflection and with the motivation 
and will to distance himself from the society whence he sprang. A person need not be 
self-made to feel and exercise at least some degree of autonomy. A belief, however 
acquired, can be that it is possible to review one's ends and even change them as it 
becomes apparent it is proper to do so. "What is central to the liberal view is not that 
we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand our selves to be prior 
to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination."79 
Such a self need not feel a compulsion to rethink its ends; it is enough that it has the 
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power and may choose to do so. Thus the warning of a returning Soviet teenager in 
1989 about the dangers of Russian youth traveling to capitalist countries: 
I had the chance to go to the United States on an exchange basis. I used 
to be a true patriot of our country and I turned into something really 
horrible. I became a human being. I think; I have my own opinions; it's a 
nightmare. After what I saw in the USA it's impossible to live here.80 
People change jobs, careers, parties, homes, and spouses (though perhaps fans 
never stop rooting for the Chicago Cubs). I may originally understand myself as a 
southwestern American Presbyterian Republican male heterosexual with a certain 
fetish, but come to understand that I will be better off without one or more of these 
"constituted" or "embedded" roles or attributes (or that, like the Tin Woodman, I 
can still be me while ridding myself of one part and adding another). We neither do 
nor need shed one practice, desire, role, or belief on a whim: We attach value to the 
changed positions we adopt. 
As a basis for determining proper governing rules, the origin of the self is irrele-
vant, therefore, since the source of the developmental force does not preordain the 
type of self it will produce.81 Animals may be unable to escape the ends assigned to 
them by biology, but for humans even anatomy is no longer destiny. A self consti-
tuted by its ends need not be cabined by them. Nothing in the empirical evidence 
offered by critics suggests that individuals cannot arise above, descend below, or 
step sideways from their origins and become something other than what, unfiltered 
by thought, they might have become. A situated sel~ in other words, can become at 
the very least a partially unencumbered one. 
The third fallacy follows from the second. Just as a particular community can 
create a partially unencumbered sel~ so too it can creale the conditions for individ-
u:wty generally, as Emile Durkheim argued more than a century ago.82 A commu-
nity, even an extremely stratified community that perpetuates social hierarch}'J may 
change over time, as invention, growth of knowledge, historical circumstance, and 
self-reflection put custom and convention to the test. In the west, the emancipa-
tion (or escape) of individuals from conununity began a thousand years ago, and 
continues to this day. A personal sense of the self began to emerge as early as the 
eleventh century.83 It was implicit in the Christian idea of personal salvation84 and 
took explicit form with the Reformation. Economically and politically, serfs and 
others from at least the twelfth century could escape their villeinage by residing a 
year and a day in a city (as the German proverb put it, Stadtluft macht Jrei: city air 
makes you free).85 An important part of this history is thus the gradual disappear-
ance of slavery, serfdom, and peonage as justified institutions, and the freeing of 
people from group responsibility and collective guilt for conduct by members of 
f: il I 86 arn y, c an, caste, and tribe. Throughout the world selves have become consider-
ably less situated and encumbered than they once were. 
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If it is incorrect to asswnc that community is reducible to its individual mem-
bers, it is no more correct, or at least no more proven, that individuals are reducible 
to the community in which they live and participate. Community and individual are 
interdependent, and so the real self does not lie at extremes. A truer conception of 
hwnanity is the self standing between the solitary and the solidary, neither the per-
son immovably attached to roles within the community to whom some antiliberals 
wish to return nor the atomistic individual whom they incorrectly blame liberals for 
creating and serving. It is the person Jacob Bronowski has called the "social 
solitary,"87 at home neither outside society nor submerged within it.88 lh.is is the 
person the liberal seeks to protect through a political system that supports liberty to 
seek the good life, individually accepted as given or modified and refined as each 
individually has chosen. 
A separate critique of the liberal conception of the autonomous self, not from the 
left but the right, can be dispatched more summarily. Some conservatives contend 
that the liberal venture must inevitably capsize on the shoals of individuals' pro-
clivity to do evil. Alan Wolfe summarizes one recent conservative claim, by John 
Kekes, that the roots of liberalism are inherently contradictory: 
If we allow individuals to be autonomous, then they may use their unfet-
tered powers to do evil things. Under such conditions, liberals face an 
impossible dilemma: if they insist on autonomy, they enhance the 
amount of cruelty in the world, but if they demand the diminishment of 
cruelty first, they undermine their commitment to autonomy .... Much 
of liberal thought, says Kekes, is devoted to unsuccessful attempts to 
avoid this dilemma. When liberals argue backward from the fact of evil 
to the view that anyone who commits such an act could not have been 
"really" autonomous, for no autonomous person would choose an evil 
course, they are attaching preconditions to agency which, whether they 
admit it or not, reduce the agent's autonomy to establish his own condi-
tions, and in this way compromising themselves philosophically.89 
Kekes's view misapprehends the claims of autonomy. Unfettered autonomy of course 
can lead evildoers to act cruelly, but a theory based on the harm principle need not 
respect claims to unfettered autonomy. The most doctrinaire libertarian agrees that 
each person's freedom must be consistent with others' like freedom. Liberalism has 
never presupposed absolute liberty or "unfettered powers," even of autonomous 
selves. Indeed, Joseph Raz, a liberal "perfectionist;' agrees that "autonomy-based 
freedom ... does not extend to the morally bad and repugnant." Raz argues, contrary 
to the liberalism I am defending, that there is an ultimate good that the state should 
pursue (namely, autonomy for each person). Since autonomy is only valuable if the 
autonomous person pursues the good, "providing, preserving or protecting bad 
. bl . al bl ''90 options does not ena e one to enJOY v ua e autonomy. 
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Pointing to the receptivity of American constitutionalism even to those who 
wish to be Nazis, Stephen Macedo comments that they must nevertheless be 
"law-abiding Nazis .... They cannot be 'gung-ho' Nazis, in fact they cannot be Nazis 
at aU but only play at it."91 That is neither an accident nor a contradiction. In the 
liberal theory here proposed, when people cause harm, whatever the nature of their 
internal selves, the state may act. Containing, moderating, deflecting, redressing, 
and eliminating harm is the state's central function.92 
A Few Words about Reason 
~u~h a.bused, rarely defined, "reason" has been attacked as responsible for liberal-
Ism's miStakes and confusions. Conservative critics berate philosophers for relying 
on mtellect to design a new society to correct unsatisfactory conditions in our pre-
sent one: ''Conservatism's enemy ... is the attempt to remake society on the basis of 
formulae, explicit rules that declare the fundamental norms for social life."93 We 
should not discount the fear. Entire societies have been brought to ruin by those 
who deduced their way to abolishing old traditions wholesale, and it is certainly 
true that reason has not bathed a single way of life in universal assent. So it is a useful 
ca~tion to be reminded that reason lies yet under the Cartesian spell that we can 
thmk our way back to the beginnings of things and then reassemble them to some-
thing brighter and more rational. It is not accidental that many liberals, reasoning 
their way to a better future, often tell founding stories, imagining social contracts, 
constrained conversations, and disembodied selves. It ought to be obvious that 
behind those veils sits the solitary thinker who wishes to make sense of things how-
ever he can. 
That is just the problem, say those who object to the reasoned elaboration of 
~olitics. Life is refractory and makes sense, if at all, only long afterward. We should, 
mstead, live in our felt communal trad!tions and refrain from adjusting them to a set 
of universal principles that are all-embracing only in the mind of a solitary philoso-
pher. Philosophy-the mind's attempt to discern goodness (or evil), rightness (or 
Wrongness), and order (or disorder) from within-can ignorantly (one hesitates to 
say .thoughtlessly) obstruct and ultimately wreck what works. Philosophy excludes 
feelings} longings1 yearnings, and the complexity of connections forged in the richness 
of the past, aU in a vain attempt to describe or explain events and generate an ordered 
system of abstract principles. Philosophy, by this account, is soulless, passionless, 
empty. It gives us nothing to cheer for. In short, philosophy is religion without the 
football tean1. 
. Moreover, the critique continues, reason is merely an option. Those who employ 
It as a tool mtolerantly assume it superior to other alternatives. Liberalism in 
essence, says Stanley Fish, is a faith in reason, and, so, liberalism is a faith like all the 
others. Though liberalism purports to be tolerant of other faiths it is not and cannot 
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be, since it necessarily discounts any world view that does not proceed according to 
reason: "[L]iberalism depends on not inquiring into the status of reason, depends, 
that is, on the assumption that reason's status is obvious: It is that which enables us 
to assess the claims of competing perspectives and beliefs:' Liberalism, says Fish, 
can be 
tolerant only within the space demarcated by the operations of reason; 
any one who steps outside that space will not be tolerated, will not be 
regarded as a fully enfranchised participant in the marketplace (of ideas) 
over which reason presides. In this liberalism does not differ from funda-
mentalism .... [T]he principle of a rationality that is above the partisan 
fray {and therefore can assure tts "fairness") is not incidental to liberal 
thought; it is liberal thought, and if it is "softened" by denying reason its 
priority and rendering it just one among many legitimate paths/ liber-
alism would have no content.94 
Liberalism wrongly claims not to be "the program of any particular group or party:' 
But since it is the program of the party of reason, it is no different from any com-
peting vision of the truth, "and therefore in the absence of that difference one can 
only conclude
1 
and conclude nonparadoxically, that liberalism doesn't exist:'
95 
Fish 
appears to be offering this sophistry without a wink and with his tongue planted 
firmly outside his cheek. 
For if there is no reason to give reason priority, there is no reason to give any 
competing approach priority either. But Fish is simply wrong, and he knows better. 
Reason is not a faith but an inescapable part of being human.96 Edmund Burke did 
not stamp his foot-he wrote a book. Reason-his reason-told him not to tinker; 
he did not go out at night, sword drawn, to dispatch his foes without an explanation. 
No competing faith dispenses with reason. Nor is it the exclusive tool of a particular 
political perspective: Mass disasters have flowed from "reasoned" policies of both 
the left and the right.97 (Even terrorists offer reasons to justify their actions, and 
reckon strategically that violence and destruction will cause their opponents to 
reconsider and will perhaps cow their compatriots too.) People of all faiths/ who live 
every way of life, employ reason continuously and broadly in explaining how their 
assumptions should translate into institutions, practices1 and rules. No religious tra-
dition could survive without reason-in an important sense, religion as practiced is 
the record of reasoned interpretation of tradition {and1 for man}'J of revelation).98 
That people's capacity to reason varies, that fools are unaware of their limitations/ 
that intelligence often strays from reasoned conclusions, that true believers often 
ignore the facts or fail to assess them, that human cognitive skill may not be suffi-
ciently powerful to understand and explain that at which it aims are no arguments 
for abandoning reason.99 As if we could. And abandon it for what? If we have learned 
that the ''role assigned to reason" in reconstructing society can be "too big," we 
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ought not forget that for most of human history it has been too small.100 The oppo-
site of reason is not some other sort of reason: It is not reasonmg. It is the Terminator. 
It is the bullet in Winston Smith's head.101 
Those sixteenth- and seventeenth-century thinkers who pondered the disloca-
~on and destruction of religious wars did not begin as liberals; they began as war-
ners. Their concern about social conditions led them to interrogate the assumptions 
that impelled rulers1 armies1 and common folk to fight and live {and die) as they did. 
~hat they found was belieflodged in superstition, acceptance rooted in authority, 
life governed by tradition. Armies of states, contending for biblical rectitude, went 
head to head1 brutal slaughter and misery the inevitable result. On the home front, 
o~e class of human being lorded over another, asserting prerogatives, privileges1 and 
diktats that astonish us today. In Great Britain, to single out only one culture, the 
lord of the manor was entitled to bed any woman within hts domain1 married or 
single/ no matter her wishes. Children were yoked to their parents' trades. A jobless 
man who strayed from home searching for work was whipped and returned to his 
parish. Social class determined manner of dress, which was strictly regulated by law. 
You went to church or you were fined, or worse (in Henry VIII's time, the penalty 
for denying transubstantiation was to be roasted alive). 102 Though the belief1 au-
thority/ and tradition seemed reasonable to those who professed the need for 
things to remain as they were1 those who thought about the misery and indignity 
that these customs and laws fostered saw that there were other possibilities. These 
other possibilities matured into liberal theories. The theories were enunciated in 
books, carried over to the street a~ maxims1 and translated piecemeal and never 
wholly into law by civil servants. 
But nothing in liberal reason1 skeptical about knowing the ultimate good, has led 
to human beings being shackled in the service of some Absolute: A political theory 
of limits and impartiality does not produce a Stalin or a Hitler, religious zealots1 or 
revolutionary despots. Certitude, not doubt, provokes violence and reaction. It was 
the unreason of antiliberals, not the reason of liberals, that almost destroyed the 
world in the first half of the twentieth century.103 
When a political argument is recorded in an essay or a book1 it cannot1 in the 
nature of things, aim at or succeed in capturing more than a partial view. Books are 
not social life, though they may intrude on it; books are not public policies, though 
they may be partisan; books are not the voices of others than their authors. Whether 
a book succeeds in prompting the change it advocates depends in large part on 
whether the author understands the assumptions of its readers. Those who wrote 
the essays that in time we came to see as liberal shared with their readers more than 
a gnawing apprehension of power. Those who identify with power-holders and dis-
count abuse are much less likely to suppose that they will ever be abused and are 
more likely therefore to accept a theory that the old ways have value and should be 
maintained. But the liberal writers came to feel that people had been abused by 
power-holders. They sought to uncover the spell that held them in its grip, and m 
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the age when science promised the power to change lives for the better, not surpris-
ingly thought that through the same power of reason they could do so too. Whether 
they reflected thoughts of the day they distilled in their writings, or prompted the 
thoughts, liberal theorists saw over time the partial success of their intellectual 
labor, both in implementing policy and translating their reasoning into the com-
monplace notions of a later day. 
What we know now, what tempered by history reason itself has taught us, is that 
reason itself is never enough; it cannot work usefully or intelligently without worldly 
knowledge. "The life of the law," Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes memorably opined, 
"has not been logic; it has been experience.''104 Liberalism as a system rooted in the 
harm principle is reason acting upon experience. Government, it began to dawn on 
people, is the application of reason to social life; that is, as we say, its rationale. Liberals 
do not suppose they can or should try to change the world in the abstract by following 
metaphysical precepts dreamed up in the darkness of a closed and isolated cloister. 
That lawmaking and policy-setting may misfire and substitute now and then a new 
evil for an existing one, as the great cynic Ambrose Bierce reminds us,105 is not a 
reason to despair. It is a reason to work harder, learn more, reason better. 
Rawls, the preeminent political theorist of our age, asks the primary political 
question anew: "When may citizens by their vote properly exercise their coe;cive 
political power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake?"106 His 
answers are difficult to assess. The complexity of his thought (and prose), and that 
of other liberal political thinkers, is problematic. One critic has complained that jus-
tice theory has "become so specialized and so academic and so utterly unreadable 
that it has become just another intellectual puzzle, a conceptual Gordian knot await-
ing its academic Alexander.''107 Liberalism opens itself for public inspection; it does 
not hide behind history's veil and should not hide behind the density of abstruse 
theory. "Like his empiricist counterparts in science, the liberal insists that intelligible 
justifications in social and political life must be available in principle for everyone, 
for society is to be understood by the individual mind, not by the tradition or sense 
of a community.''108 In that spirit, seeking to answer the primary question, this book 
proceeds. 
